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Besides being a very interesting, cogent, and even a tidy study, "Strategic
Regulators"1 sheds some bright light on agency behavior and on the important
issue of whether agency rulemaking may be "ossifying."2
The study design employed by Hamilton and Schroeder is attractively simple.
They started with all of the Environmental Protection Agency's ("EPA's")
hazardous waste regulations under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
("RCRA") appearing in the Code of Federal Regulations ("CFR"), counting each
decimal point CFR number as a separate rule. This yielded 697 rules. They
then examined all EPA/RCRA guidance documents issued since the inception
of the program (1980-1991) and matched them to the appropriate CFR rule.'
Some CFR rules had associated guidance documents, and some did not. After
characterizing the type and history of the individual CFR rules, the authors then
developed hypotheses as to why certain CFR rules were more or less likely to
be accompanied by supplemental guidance documents.
A premise underlying this research is that agencies seem to be avoiding
notice-and-comment rulemaking in favor of greater reliance on more informal
issuances.4  One problem with examining this premise, of course, is the
compared-to-what issue. We know, for example, that federal agency rulemaking
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LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
(at least as measured by the inadequate surrogate of Federal Register rulemaking
documents and pages) peaked in 1979, dropped rather sharply in the early 1980s,
and then edged back up through the late 1980s.'
Looking at the RCRA slide provided by Hamilton and Schroeder, we see a
similar, albeit bumpier, curve in the EPA's notice-and-comment rulemaking,
while the EPA's more informal issuances rose sharply in the mid-1980s, only to
drop off again in the late 1980s.6 Before making any government-wide
generalizations, however, we still need better data, and better ways to measure
data, on the rise and fall (and perhaps rise again) of agency rulemaking. Even
when the data is available for a single program at a single agency, one wishes to
know more about the institutional staffing, budgets, priorities, and, perhaps, the
shadow of proposed rules waiting in the wings at the agency or at the Office of
Mnagement and Budget ("OMB"). Nevertheless, the beauty of the Hamil-
ton/Schroeder idea and database is that it allows us to document a relationship
between agency rules and "non-rule" rules.7 It is quite illuminating to discover
that certain types of rules-based either on their "target" or their "rule




The study's most provocative finding is that rules issued pursuant to
legislative or judicial pressures (statutory deadlines with or without "hammers,"9
court remands, consent decrees) are much more likely to be paired with informal
5. See generally Mashaw, supra note 2.
6. See Hamilton & Schroeder, supra note 1, at 152 (Table 4).
7. This somewhat oxymoronic term is shorthand for the various types of ("nonlegislative")
interpretations, policy statements, and other guidance documents issued by agencies in place of
("legislative") rules normally issued after notice and comment. Professor Asimow has labeled them
"underground" regulations. Michael Asimow, California Underground Regulations, 44 ADMN. L. REV.
43 (1992). For a fuller "taxonomical guide to agency rulemaking," see Anthony, supra note 4, at 1319-27.
8. All CFR "rules" with one or more associated guidance documents were flagged. In addition,
the type of guidance document was noted (that is "Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response
("OSWER") directive," "Regulation Development Branch ("RDB") memo," or "hotline response").
However, no attempt was made to gauge the number or significance of such documents associated with
each CFR rule.
9. "Hammers" are legislative "or else" provisions which take effect when the agency misses the
statutory deadline for rulemaking. In effect, RCRA § 3001 (a), (b) contained a hammer requiring the
EPA to list hazardous wastes subject to regulation within 18 months of passage. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921(a),
(b) (1988). See Alden F. Abbott, Case Studies on the Costs of Federal Statutory and Judicial Deadlines,
39 ADMIN. L. REV. 467,475-76 (1987). An even more notorious hammer was contained in the Nutrition
Labeling and Education Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-535, 104 Stat. 2353, which required the Secretary
of Health and Human Services ("HHS") to issue proposed food labeling regulations within 12 months
of enactment and final regulations within 24 months. The Act specified that if the final regulations did
not meet the deadline, the proposed regulations "shall be considered the final regulations." Id. § 3(b)(2).
HHS did not meet the deadline for final regulations, leading to a period of regulatory uncertainty. The
final regulations were published at 58 Fed. Reg. 2302 (1993) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 5 & 101).
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issuances.1" This might seem somewhat surprising, because one would think
that an agency operating under a legislative or judicial spotlight would
demonstrate responsiveness by relying on the more formal route of notice-and-
comment rulemaking. On the other hand, when the informal directives are
viewed as supplementary guidance, it becomes less surprising that an agency
under pressure to issue rules might reserve some of the elaborative aspects of the
issue for guidance documents.
For this reason, I would caution the authors not to overly compartmentalize
the EPA's behavior in this regard. Even using the authors' rough terminology
of "formal" (CFR) versus "informal" (guidance document) rules," they go too
far in equating "rules with directives" with "informal" rules. 2 Surely just
because a formal rule has one or more informal issuances associated with it does
not make the formal rule any less formal. Such a rule may perhaps be deemed
less complete, although that is simply another way of saying that the rule needs
amplification. There is a slightly normative tinge to their discussion-that
somehow a rule accompanied by the informal issuance is of a lesser quality rule
than a rule standing alone. This may indeed be true, if the former is incomplete
or is confusing. On the other hand, the accompanied rule might be more in need
of amplification for a different reason-because of its importance and because
it resulted in great attention and interest from the regulated community. In
some sense, such a rule is more formal.
In probing this perhaps overly semantic debate, it is also important to
remember the authors' own caution that they did not observe the timing of the
respective issuances. It might be quite important to know which came first-the
rule or the directive(s). Did one engender or result from the other? A rule
issued for the purpose of codifying a series of informal issuances hardly seems
less formal. Nevertheless, from the standpoint of Congress or a court that is
especially desirous of an agency rulemaking, this study shows that it behooves
the overseer to pay close attention to the full range of agency rulemaking
behaviors when the agency responds.
Hamilton and Schroeder present several other hypotheses about what factors
lead the EPA to issue formal versus informal rules:
10. OSWER directives were much more likely to be associated with rules issued pursuant to
hammers ("HAMT"), court deadlines ("CRTIMPT"), or court remand ("CRTRTEMT"). This was only
slightly less true with respect to RDB memos and hotline responses. See Hamilton & Schroeder, supra
note 1, at 150 (Table 2). The corollary hypothesis is discussed id. at 139-46.
11. While this terminology seems apt in that the guidance documents are normally issued in a less
formal manner than notice-and-comment rulemaking, the use of "informal" in this context could lead
to confusion because notice-and-comment rulemaking (under § 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act)
has long been called "informal rulemaking" in contradistinction to the quasi-adjudicative (and now little
used) "formal rulemaking" under §§ 553(c), 556, and 557 of the APA. One of the theses of scholars such
as McGarity and Mashaw, supra note 2, is that "informal rulemaking" has become overly formal.
12. For example, at various points, the authors use the word "informal" to describe a situation
where the agency's CFR rule has a directive associated with it. But because neither the comparative
significance nor the timing of the two issuances is examined, it is difficult to assume any such motivation
on the part of the agency in the abstract. On the other hand, the authors' analysis of the type of rules
more or less likely to be supplemented does provide interesting clues to the agency's motivation.
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1. As the transaction costs of securing an agreement go up, the agency
will be more likely to go informal. 3
2. As the political costs of adopting a given rule increase, the agency
will be more likely to go informal. 4
3. The higher the costs imposed on regulated parties, the more likely
they will resist and, hence, the more likely the agency will go
informal."
4. As concern for uniformity, enforceability, the value of precedent, and
the advantages of avoiding individual adjudication go up, the agency
will be less likely to go informal. 6
In my view, hypotheses 1-3 overlap. They really boil down to the precept
that an agency is more likely "to go informal" (although not necessarily "versus"
going formal) where the level of controversy is high. This hypothesis should not
be surprising; in fact, it mirrors the advice given by the Administrative
Conference on the subject of "negotiated rulemaking."' 7 The structured process
of "reg-neg" depends on achieving actual consensus through negotiation. Thus,
the Conference cautioned that the issues involved in a potential reg-neg "should
not be such as to require participants in negotiations to compromise their
fundamental tenets, since it is unlikely that agreement will be reached in such
circumstances."' 8 Hamilton and Schroeder have extended this idea to the less-
structured notice-and-comment rulemaking process, which, after all, does not
require actual consensus (although that always helps), but only an apparent
rationality and reasonableness on the part of the agency. It is thus interesting
that the EPA's behavior in RCRA rulemaking does bear out the hypothesis.
The EPA's enforcement rules are significantly more likely to be the subject of
informal guidance than nonenforcement rules. Similarly, the EPA's rules
targeting landfills (associated with numerous or controversial groundwater
contamination issues) are significantly more likely to be the subject of informal
issuances than rules targeting tanks and containers.
Hypothesis 4, however, seems to partially contradict the controversiality
hypothesis. That is, the fourth hypothesis predicts that the higher the number
of regulated parties affected by the rule, the more likely the agency will wish to
bind them through a rule issued through notice-and-comment procedure so as to
avoid numerous individual adjudications. Thus, because there were nearly 1800
facilities storing waste in tanks and containers and only 18 landfill facilities, it is
more likely that tank and container rules would be formal/unsupplemented. This
hypothesis was confirmed by the authors' findings. Nevertheless, it seems to me
that the number of regulated entities potentially affected by a rule should
13. Hamilton & Schroeder, supra note 1, at 130.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 131.
17. Administrative Conference of the United States ("ACUS") Recommendations 82-4, 85-5,
"Procedures For Negotiating Proposed Regulations," 1 C.F.R. § 305.82-4 (1992).
18. 1 C.F.R. § 305.32-4, 85-5 4(b).
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correlate to some degree with the controversiality of the rule-the more the
"adversarier." This may, of course, depend on external variables such as the
degree of organization within the industry as well. Perhaps the tank and
container industry was "asleep at the switch" when the EPA proposed its rule.
Or, perhaps, it found the rule to its liking. Credit is due to Hamilton and
Schroeder for even allowing us to plumb these questions.
Other avenues of inquiry are opened up by this stimulating article. It would,
for example, be interesting to delve more deeply into the differences between the
three types of issuances (OSWER directives, RDB memos, and hotline
responses) used by the EPA in this program. Why did the agency change its
approach from directives to even more informal hotline responses?19 Moreover,
why did the total amount of informal issuances drop off so much in the late
1980s? Had most of the regulatory interstices been filled?
Researchers also need to devise ways to evaluate the article's premise
(reflected in hypothesis 4, for example) that formal (legislative) rules are more
enforceable than nonlegislative rules. Especially where the agency has the




This thought brings me to the terminus of this comment-which as in many
administrative law articles is in the "Chevron station."21 A week before this
symposium I attended an oral argument in the D.C. Circuit in which the Solicitor
of Labor was defending a program directive issued by the Mine Safety and
Health Administration concerning testing and reporting procedures for
pneumoconiosis in coal mines.' The American Mining Congress had chal-
lenged the directive on the ground that it should have been issued as a final rule,
using notice-and-comment procedures. The Solicitor argued that the directive
was an interpretive rule and thus exempt from notice-and-comment under the
APA.
In the course of the argument, the issue arose as to whether, if the court
agreed with the Department that the rule was interpretive, the rule would still
19. Hamilton & Schroeder, supra note 1, at 152 (Table 4). The use of OSWER Directives
predominated from 1980-85; use of RDB memos (issued by a branch of OSWER) and hotline responses
began to emerge in 1985. Presumably, the latter two issuances require lower-level sign-offs than the
OSWER Directives (or, of course, agency rules published in the Federal Register).
20. See Peter Huber, Exorcists vs. Gatekeepers in Risk Regulation, REGULATION, Nov.-Dec. 1983,
at 23-32; Peter Huber, The Old-New Division in Risk Regulation, 69 VA. L. REV. 1025 (1983).
21. Cf Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station.: An Empirical Study of
Federal Administrative Law, 1990 DuKE LJ. 984.
22. Oral argument, American Mining Congress v. Mine Safety and Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106
(D.C. Cir. 1993).
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
be entitled to Chevron deference.' The Solicitor quite forthrightly said "no."
He stated that the Department had had a choice: it could have gone through
legislative (what Hamilton and Schroeder call "formal") rulemaking and thereby
achieved a rule possessing the force of law and entitled to Chevron deference,
or it could have, for efficiency reasons, used an informal directive not entitled to
such deference. In this case, the Department used an informal directive in the
hope that a reviewing court would uphold the reasonableness of the agency's
interpretation without the added Chevron deference.
This choice-by the "strategic regulator"-is the very choice that Hamilton
and Schroeder have placed under the microscope so ably. I would hope that
they and other researchers will emulate and refine their technique with similar
databases in the future. All of us, whether students of regulation, legislators,
judicial reviewers, or presidential coordinators, need to understand better (and
predict) the behavior of strategic regulators.
23. "Chevron deference" refers to Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837, 843-45 (1984), in which the Supreme Court instructed reviewing courts to give greater
deference to agencies' interpretations of their own statutes.
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